Know Your Constitution (4): What Is Equal Protection? | Nahmod Law

Previous (Epstein-Barr virus). Next (Equator). The Equal Protection Clause, part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that "no state shall… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."The equal protection clause is a section of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution that says that states cannot, "deny to any person In response, the federal government determined that in addition to protecting people from discrimination on a federal level, there was also an obligation to...The Bill of Rights originally protected citizens only from the national government. For example, although the Constitution prohibited the establishment of In the 1960s and '70s the equal protection clause was used by the Supreme Court to extend protections to other areas, including zoning laws...The equal protection clause is not intended to provide equality among. The equal protection clause is not intended to. School DeVry University, Chicago. Course Title BUSN 420.4 it was only intended to protect the rights of newly freed slaves and no others. Essay question: The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying any persons within its jurisdiction the protection of How does the language of the equal protection clause show.

What is the Equal Protection Clause? (with pictures)

The Equal Protection Clause 14th Amendment: "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 1. Applies equally to states and federal government, and 2. The government can't discriminate against a particular group of people or favor a group of people unless it...The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was at first created to protect against racial discrimination, but the Supreme Court later expanded the clause to also providing equal treatment amongst different races. The clause says, "No state shall…deny to any..."The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from denying any person within its territory the equal Police brutality should be lessened because police are meant to be there to protect a community; however, the people being targeted by brutal...Equal Protection clause----The laws of a state must treat an individual in the same manner as others in similar conditions and circumstances. The equal protection clause is not intended to provide "equality" among individuals or classes but only "equal application" of the laws.

What is the Equal Protection Clause? (with pictures)

Constitution of the United States of America - Civil liberties... | Britannica

I think we'll have the Equal Protection Clause for you on the screen. Stuart is non -- Stuart Taylor is a non-reside nt fellow at the Brookings Institution and co -author of the book "Mismatch: How A ffirmative Action Hurts Students Its Intended to Help and Why Universities Won't Admit it."The Equal Protection Clause is one of the most litigated and significant provisions in contemporary constitutional law. The meaning of the clause is The command to treat persons equally extends to all actions by the government. Most commentators agree, however, that the intended scope of the......however, that the Equal Protection Clause "was not intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation" and propounded some purpose was invalid under equal protection analysis would also be a basis for invalidation under a different strand of Commerce Clause analysis.1567.Equal Protection refers to the idea that a governmental body may not deny people equal protection of its governing laws. The governing body state must treat an individual in the same manner as others in similar conditions and Thus, the equal protection clause is crucial to the protection of civil rights.The Equal Protection Clause is the primary constitutional tool for addressing claims of identity-based discrimination. Structuring equal protection around identity and deciding to elevate only some categories to a Lauren Sudeall Lucas: Why Equal Protection may not protect everyone equally.

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The Equal Protection Clause is part of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The clause, which took effect in 1868, supplies "nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". It mandates that individuals in identical eventualities be handled similarly by way of the legislation.[1][2][3]

A number one motivation for this clause was to validate the equality provisions contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which assured that all electorate would have the assured correct to equal protection via legislation. As an entire, the Fourteenth Amendment marked a big shift in American constitutionalism, by way of making use of substantially more constitutional restrictions in opposition to the states than had implemented ahead of the Civil War.

The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause has been the topic of much debate, and inspired the well known phrase "Equal Justice Under Law". This clause was the basis for Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court resolution that helped to dismantle racial segregation, and also the foundation for plenty of different selections rejecting discrimination towards, and bigotry in opposition to, folks belonging to various groups.

While the Equal Protection Clause itself applies simplest to state and native governments, the Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nevertheless imposes various equal protection necessities on the federal executive by the use of reverse incorporation.

Text

The Equal Protection Clause is located at the finish of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:

All individuals born or naturalized in the United States, and matter to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they live. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive anyone of existence, liberty, or property, without due strategy of regulation; nor deny to any person inside of its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [emphasis added]

Background

Congressman John Bingham of Ohio was the essential framer of the Equal Protection Clause.

Though equality underneath the law is an American criminal tradition arguably dating to the Declaration of Independence,[4] formal equality for many teams remained elusive. Before passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, which included the Equal Protection Clause, American legislation didn't extend constitutional rights to black Americans.[5] Black people were considered inferior to white Americans, and topic to chattel slavery in the slave states until the Emancipation Proclamation and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Even black Americans that weren't enslaved lacked many crucial prison protections.[5] In the 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford resolution, the Supreme Court rejected abolitionism and decided black men, whether or not unfastened or in bondage, had no legal rights under the U.S. Constitution at the time.[6] Currently, a plurality of historians imagine that this judicial resolution set the United States on the trail to the Civil War, which led to the ratifications of the Reconstruction Amendments.[7]  

Before and all the way through the Civil War, the Southern states prohibited speech of pro-Union voters, anti-slavery advocates, and northerners in general, since the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states right through such times. During the Civil War, a lot of the Southern states stripped the state citizenship of many whites and banished them from their state, effectively seizing their belongings. Shortly after the Union victory in the American Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment was proposed through Congress and ratified by the states in 1865, abolishing slavery. Subsequently, many ex-Confederate states then followed Black Codes following the warfare, with those regulations significantly restricting the rights of blacks to hold assets, including actual assets (akin to actual property), and many sorts of personal belongings, and to form legally enforceable contracts. Such codes also established harsher legal penalties for blacks than for whites.[8]

Because of the inequality imposed by means of Black Codes, a Republican-controlled Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Act supplied that every one persons born in the United States were citizens (contrary to the Supreme Court's 1857 resolution in Dred Scott v. Sandford), and required that "citizens of every race and color ... [have] full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."[9]

President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 amid considerations (among other issues) that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to enact such invoice. Such doubts were one factor that led Congress to start to draft and debate what would change into the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[10][11] Additionally, Congress sought after to protect white Unionists who were underneath personal and legal assault in the former Confederacy.[12] The effort was led via the Radical Republicans of both houses of Congress, including John Bingham, Charles Sumner, and Thaddeus Stevens. It was the maximum influential of those men, John Bingham, who was the foremost author and drafter of the Equal Protection Clause.

The Southern states have been hostile to the Civil Rights Act, yet in 1865 Congress, exercising its power underneath Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution, to "be the Judge of the ... Qualifications of its own Members", had excluded Southerners from Congress, stating that their states, having rebelled in opposition to the Union, may just subsequently now not elect participants to Congress. It was this truth—the incontrovertible fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted via a "rump" Congress—that authorized the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment by means of Congress and subsequently proposed to the states. The ratification of the amendment by way of the former Confederate states was imposed as a situation of their acceptance again into the Union.[13]

Ratification

With the return to originalist interpretations of the Constitution, many surprise what was intended via the framers of the reconstruction amendments at the time of their ratification. The 13th modification abolished slavery yet to what extent it protected other rights was unclear.[14] After the 13th modification the South started to institute Black Codes that have been restrictive regulations in the hunt for to keep black Americans in a position of inferiority. The 14th modification was ratified by means of fearful Republicans in response to the rise of Black Codes.[14] This ratification was abnormal in many ways. First there have been a couple of states that rejected the 14th amendment, but if their new governments had been created due to reconstruction, these new governments permitted the amendment.[15] There had been also two states, Ohio and New Jersey, that permitted the amendment and then later handed resolutions rescinding that acceptance. The nullification of the two state's acceptance was regarded as illegitimate and each Ohio and New Jersey have been integrated in those counted as ratifying the amendment.[15]

Many historians have argued that 14th amendment was now not originally intended to grant sweeping political and social rights to the electorate but as a substitute to solidify the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil rights Act.[16] While it's broadly agreed that this was a key reason for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, many historians adopt a wider view. It is a popular interpretation that the Fourteenth Amendment was all the time supposed to be certain equal rights for all the ones in the United States.[17] This argument was utilized by Charles Sumner when he used the 14th amendment as the basis for his arguments to expand the protections afforded to black Americans.[18]

Though the equal protection clause is certainly one of the most cited concepts in felony idea, it gained little attention all through the ratification of the 14th modification.[19] Instead the key tenet of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of its ratification was the Privileges or Immunities Clause.[16] This clause sought to protect the privileges and immunities of all electorate which now incorporated black men.[20] The scope of this clause was considerably narrowed following the Slaughterhouse Cases during which it was decided that a citizen's privileges and immunities have been most effective ensured at the Federal stage and that it was government overreach to impose this standard on the states.[17] Even on this halting decision the Court nonetheless said the context in which the Amendment was passed, stating that understanding the evils and injustice the 14th amendment was supposed to battle is key in our prison understanding of its implications and objective.[21] With the abridgment of the Privileges or Immunities clause, felony arguments geared toward protecting black American's rights turned into extra complex and that is when the equal protection clause began to achieve attention for the arguments it could fortify.[16]  

During the debate in Congress, multiple version of the clause was thought to be. Here is the first model: "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure ... to all persons in the several states equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property."[22] Bingham stated about this version: "It confers upon Congress power to see to it that the protection given by the laws of the States shall be equal in respect to life and liberty and property to all persons."[22] The major opponent of the first version was Congressman Robert S. Hale of New York, regardless of Bingham's public assurances that "under no possible interpretation can it ever be made to operate in the State of New York while she occupies her present proud position."[23]

Hale ended up balloting for the ultimate model, however. When Senator Jacob Howard presented that final model, he stated:[24]

It prohibits the striking of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same protect which it throws over the white man. Ought now not the time to be now handed when one measure of justice is to be meted out to a member of 1 caste while another and a unique measure is meted out to the member of any other caste, both castes being alike electorate of the United States, both sure to obey the similar regulations, to sustain the burdens of the identical Government, and each similarly responsible to justice and to God for the deeds completed in the body?

The thirty ninth United States Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment on June 13, 1866. A difference between the initial and final versions of the clause was that the final model spoke no longer just of "equal protection" yet of "the equal protection of the laws". John Bingham said in January 1867: "no State may deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, including all the limitations for personal protection of every article and section of the Constitution ..."[25] By July 9, 1868, three-fourths of the states (28 of 37) ratified the modification, and that's when the Equal Protection Clause turned into legislation.[26]

Early history following ratification

Bingham said in a speech on March 31, 1871 that the clause supposed no State may just deny to anybody "the equal protection of the Constitution of the United States ... [or] any of the rights which it guarantees to all men", nor deny to somebody "any right secured to him either by the laws and treaties of the United States or of such State."[27] At that time, the that means of equality numerous from one state to another.[28]

This drawing by means of E. W. Kemble shows a sleeping Congress with a damaged 14th Amendment. It makes the case that Congress ignored its constitutional obligations to Black Americans.

Four of the unique thirteen states never passed any laws barring interracial marriage, and the other states had been divided on the factor in the Reconstruction technology.[29] In 1872, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the state's ban on mixed-race marriage violated the "cardinal principle" of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and of the Equal Protection Clause.[30] Almost a hundred years would go earlier than the U.S. Supreme Court adopted that Alabama case (Burns v. State) in the case of Loving v. Virginia. In Burns, the Alabama Supreme Court said:[31]

Marriage is a civil contract, and in that character by myself is handled through the municipal regulation. The similar right to make a freelance as is loved by way of white electorate, way the correct to make any contract which a white citizen would possibly make. The regulation intended to damage the distinctions of race and coloration in respect to the rights secured via it.

As for public schooling, no states right through this period of Reconstruction in truth required separate faculties for blacks.[32] However, some states (e.g. New York) gave native districts discretion to arrange colleges that were deemed separate yet equal.[33] In distinction, Iowa and Massachusetts flatly prohibited segregated colleges ever since the 1850s.[34]

Likewise, some states have been more favorable to ladies's criminal standing than others; New York, as an example, were giving girls complete property, parental, and widow's rights since 1860, yet no longer the correct to vote.[35] No state or territory allowed women's suffrage when the Equal Protection Clause took effect in 1868.[36] In contrast, at that time African American men had complete vote casting rights in five states.[37]

Gilded Age interpretation and the Plessy resolution

In the United States, the yr 1877 marked the finish of Reconstruction and the start of the Gilded Age. The first in reality landmark equal protection resolution by way of the Supreme Court was Strauder v. West Virginia (1880). A black guy convicted of murder via an all-white jury challenged a West Virginia statute except blacks from serving on juries. Exclusion of blacks from juries, the Court concluded, was a denial of equal protection to black defendants, since the jury were "drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man of [the defendant's] race." At the similar time, the Court explicitly allowed sexism and different sorts of discrimination, pronouncing that states "may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this. ... Its aim was against discrimination because of race or color."[38]

The Court that decided Plessy

The next essential postwar case was the Civil Rights Cases (1883), by which the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was at issue. The Act provided that every one persons should have "full and equal enjoyment of ... inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement." In its opinion, the Court explicated what has since transform referred to as the "state action doctrine", in accordance to which the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause practice most effective to acts achieved or in a different way "sanctioned in some way" via the state. Prohibiting blacks from attending performs or staying in inns was "simply a private wrong". Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on my own, pronouncing, "I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." Harlan went on to argue that as a result of (1) "public conveyances on land and water" use the public highways, and (2) innkeepers interact in what's "a quasi-public employment", and (3) "places of public amusement" are licensed under the rules of the states, aside from blacks from the use of those services and products was an act sanctioned by the state.

A few years later, Justice Stanley Matthews wrote the Court's opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886).[39] In it the phrase "person" from the 14th Amendment's section has been given the broadest possible which means via the U.S. Supreme Court:[40]

These provisions are universal of their utility to all persons inside of the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any variations of race, of shade, or of nationality, and the equal protection of the rules is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.

Thus, the Clause would not be restricted to discrimination towards African Americans, yet would extend to different races, colours, and nationalities comparable to (on this case) prison aliens in the United States who're Chinese citizens.

In its most contentious Gilded Age interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana Jim Crow law that required the segregation of blacks and whites on railroads and mandated separate railway vehicles for members of the two races.[41] The Court, speaking through Justice Henry B. Brown, ruled that the Equal Protection Clause have been intended to shield equality in civil rights, not equality in social arrangements. All that was subsequently required of the legislation was reasonableness, and Louisiana's railway law amply met that requirement, being in accordance with "the established usages, customs and traditions of the people." Justice Harlan once more dissented. "Every one knows," he wrote,

that the statute in query had its foundation in the goal, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad automobiles occupied through blacks, as to exclude coloured folks from coaches occupied via or assigned to white persons  ... [I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the regulation, there's in this nation no superior, dominant, ruling category of electorate. There is not any caste right here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among electorate.

Such "arbitrary separation" by means of race, Harlan concluded, was "a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution."[42] Harlan's philosophy of constitutional colorblindness would sooner or later turn out to be more extensively accepted, especially after World War II.

It was also in the Gilded Age that a ruling by way of the Supreme Court included headnotes written via John C. Bancroft, a former railway corporate president. Bancroft, appearing as court docket reporter, indicated in the headnotes that firms were "persons", whilst the precise court docket resolution itself have shyed away from particular statements referring to the Equal Protection Clause as carried out to firms.[43] However, the prison idea of corporate personhood predates the Fourteenth Amendment.[44] In the late nineteenth and early 20th centuries, the Clause was used to strike down a lot of statutes applying to companies. Since the New Deal, alternatively, such invalidations had been uncommon.[45]

Between Plessy and Brown

The U.S. Supreme Court Building opened in 1935, inscribed with the words "Equal Justice Under Law" that have been inspired via the Equal Protection Clause.[46]

In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938), Lloyd Gaines was a black scholar at Lincoln University of Missouri, one in all the traditionally black schools in Missouri. He applied for admission to the legislation faculty at the all-white University of Missouri, since Lincoln did not have a legislation college, but was denied admission due solely to his race. The Supreme Court, applying the separate-but-equal theory of Plessy, held that a State offering a prison schooling to whites but not to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause.

In Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), the Court showed larger willingness to in finding racial discrimination illegal. The Shelley case concerned a privately made contract that prohibited "people of the Negro or Mongolian race" from dwelling on a specific piece of land. Seeming to move against the spirit, if not the precise letter, of The Civil Rights Cases, the Court discovered that, despite the fact that a discriminatory personal contract could not violate the Equal Protection Clause, the courts' enforcement of this kind of contract may; in any case, the Supreme Court reasoned, courts have been a part of the state.

The better half instances Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, each determined in 1950, paved the manner for a chain of faculty integration circumstances. In McLaurin, the University of Oklahoma had admitted McLaurin, an African-American, yet had limited his actions there: he had to sit down aside from the remainder of the scholars in the study rooms and library, and may devour in the cafeteria handiest at a designated desk. A unanimous Court, through Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, said that Oklahoma had disadvantaged McLaurin of the equal protection of the regulations:

There is a limiteless distinction—a Constitutional distinction—between restrictions imposed by the state which limit the intellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle the place the state gifts no such bar.

The present state of affairs, Vinson said, was the former. In Sweatt, the Court regarded as the constitutionality of Texas's state device of law schools, which skilled blacks and whites at separate establishments. The Court (again via Chief Justice Vinson, and once more with no dissenters) invalidated the college device—now not as it separated students, yet reasonably as a result of the separate amenities were not equal. They lacked "substantial equality in the educational opportunities" offered to their scholars.

All of these circumstances, in addition to the upcoming Brown case, were litigated by means of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It was Charles Hamilton Houston, a Harvard Law School graduate and regulation professor at Howard University, who in the 1930s first began to challenge racial discrimination in the federal courts. Thurgood Marshall, a former pupil of Houston's and the long run Solicitor General and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, joined him. Both males were extremely skilled appellate advocates, yet a part of their shrewdness lay in their careful choice of which circumstances to litigate, settling on the perfect prison proving grounds for his or her reason.[47]

Brown and its consequences

See additionally: Brown v. Board of Education

In 1954 the contextualization of the equal protection clause would exchange perpetually. The Supreme Court itself known the gravity of the Brown v Board resolution acknowledging that a cut up resolution can be a danger to the role of the Supreme Court or even to the nation.[48] When Earl Warren become Chief Justice in 1953, Brown had already come earlier than the Court. While Vinson was still Chief Justice, there had been a preliminary vote on the case at a conference of all 9 justices. At that point, the Court had split, with a majority of the justices balloting that faculty segregation didn't violate the Equal Protection Clause. Warren, then again, thru persuasion and good-natured cajoling—he have been an especially a hit Republican politician before becoming a member of the Court—was able to persuade all 8 associate justices to join his opinion pointing out school segregation unconstitutional.[49] In that opinion, Warren wrote:

To separate [kids in grade and top colleges] from others of identical age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a sense of inferiority as to their standing in the community that may have an effect on their hearts and minds in some way unlikely ever to be undone ... We conclude that in the box of public schooling the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no position. Separate tutorial amenities are inherently unequal.

Warren discouraged other justices, comparable to Robert H. Jackson, from publishing any concurring opinion; Jackson's draft, which emerged a lot later (in 1988), integrated this observation: "Constitutions are easier amended than social customs, and even the North never fully conformed its racial practices to its professions".[50][51] The Court set the case for re-argument on the query of the way to put in force the decision. In Brown II, decided in 1954, it was concluded that since the problems identified in the previous opinion were local, the answers wanted to be so as well. Thus the court docket devolved authority to local school boards and to the trial courts that had originally heard the circumstances. (Brown was in fact a consolidation of 4 different circumstances from four other states.) The trial courts and localities had been instructed to desegregate with "all deliberate speed".

The Court that decided Brown

Partly because of that enigmatic phrase, but mostly on account of self-declared "massive resistance" in the South to the desegregation decision, integration didn't start in any significant means till the mid-Nineteen Sixties and then best to a small stage. In reality, a lot of the integration in the 1960s took place in response no longer to Brown yet to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court intervened a handful of instances in the overdue Nineteen Fifties and early Sixties, yet its subsequent major desegregation decision was no longer till Green v. School Board of New Kent County (1968), during which Justice William J. Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected a "freedom-of-choice" school plan as inadequate. This was a vital resolution; freedom-of-choice plans had been very common responses to Brown. Under these plans, parents could select to send their kids to either a previously white or a previously black college. Whites nearly by no means opted to attend black-identified faculties, on the other hand, and blacks hardly ever attended white-identified schools.

In reaction to Green, many Southern districts changed freedom-of-choice with geographically based totally education plans; because residential segregation was in style, little integration was accomplished. In 1971, the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education licensed busing as a treatment to segregation; three years later, even though, in the case of Milliken v. Bradley (1974), it set aside a decrease court order that had required the busing of scholars between districts, as a substitute of simply inside of a district. Milliken basically ended the Supreme Court's major involvement in class desegregation; then again, up via the 1990s many federal trial courts remained focused on school desegregation circumstances, many of which had begun in the Nineteen Fifties and Sixties.[52]

The curtailment of busing in Milliken v. Bradley is one in every of a number of reasons that have been cited to provide an explanation for why equalized educational opportunity in the United States has fallen short of finishing touch. In the view of more than a few liberal students, the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 intended that the executive branch was not in the back of the Court's constitutional commitments.[53] Also, the Court itself made up our minds in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) that the Equal Protection Clause lets in—yet does not require—a state to provide equal educational investment to all students inside the state.[54] Moreover, the Court's decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) allowed families to opt out of public schools, regardless of "inequality in economic resources that made the option of private schools available to some and not to others", as Martha Minow has put it.[55]

American public school programs, particularly in massive metropolitan areas, to a large extent are nonetheless de facto segregated. Whether due to Brown, or due to Congressional action, or due to societal exchange, the percentage of black scholars attending majority-black school districts decreased somewhat till the early Eighties, at which point that proportion started to building up. By the past due 1990s, the proportion of black scholars in most commonly minority college districts had returned to about what it was in the past due Nineteen Sixties.[56] In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007), the Court held that, if a college system become racially imbalanced due to social components rather then governmental racism, then the state is not as free to combine schools as though the state were at fault for the racial imbalance. This is particularly obvious in the constitution college machine where oldsters of students can select which schools their youngsters attend in line with the facilities provided via that college and the needs of the child. It turns out that race is a think about the number of constitution faculty.[57]

Application to federal executive

By its phrases, the clause restrains best state governments. However, the Fifth Amendment's due procedure guarantee, starting with Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), has been interpreted as implementing a few of the same restrictions on the federal executive: "Though the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the States, the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive."[58] In Lawrence v. Texas (2003) the Supreme Court added: "Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests"[59] Some scholars have argued that the Court's decision in Bolling must had been reached on different grounds. For example, Michael W. McConnell has written that Congress by no means "required that the schools of the District of Columbia be segregated."[60] According to that rationale, the segregation of colleges in Washington D.C. was unauthorized and due to this fact illegal.

Tiered scrutiny

Despite the undoubted significance of Brown, a lot of modern equal protection jurisprudence originated in different cases, despite the fact that not everyone agrees about which different circumstances. Many scholars assert that the opinion of Justice Harlan Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938)[61] contained a footnote that was a important turning point for equal protection jurisprudence,[62] but that assertion is disputed.[63]

Whatever its actual origins, the fundamental thought of the fashionable means is that extra judicial scrutiny is caused via purported discrimination that involves "fundamental rights" (corresponding to the correct to procreation), and in a similar fashion extra judicial scrutiny may be prompted if the purported victim of discrimination has been centered as a result of he or she belongs to a "suspect classification" (akin to a single racial workforce). This trendy doctrine was pioneered in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), which involved depriving positive criminals of the elementary right to procreate:[64]

When the regulation lays an unequal hand on those who have dedicated intrinsically the identical high quality of offense and sterilizes one and no longer the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had decided on a specific race or nationality for oppressive remedy.

Until 1976, the Supreme Court most often ended up dealing with discrimination via the usage of considered one of two imaginable levels of scrutiny: what has come to be known as "strict scrutiny" (when a suspect class or elementary appropriate is involved), or instead the extra lenient "rational basis review". Strict scrutiny signifies that a challenged statute must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling" government hobby, and will have to no longer have a "less restrictive" alternative. In distinction, rational foundation scrutiny merely requires that a challenged statute be "reasonably related" to a "legitimate" executive pastime.

However, in the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren, the Court added every other tier of scrutiny, known as "intermediate scrutiny", referring to gender discrimination. The Court may have added different tiers too, reminiscent of "enhanced rational basis" scrutiny,[65] and "exceedingly persuasive basis" scrutiny.[66]

All of that is known as "tiered" scrutiny, and it has had many critics, including Justice Thurgood Marshall who argued for a "spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination", as a substitute of discrete tiers.[67] Justice John Paul Stevens argued for just one stage of scrutiny, for the reason that "there is only one Equal Protection Clause".[67] The whole tiered strategy developed via the Court is supposed to reconcile the idea of equal protection with the truth that most laws necessarily discriminate come what may.[68]

Choosing the standard of scrutiny can decide the result of a case, and the strict scrutiny same old is continuously described as "strict in theory and fatal in fact".[69] In order to select the right kind degree of scrutiny, Justice Antonin Scalia prompt the Court to determine rights as "fundamental" or determine categories as "suspect" via inspecting what was understood when the Equal Protection Clause was adopted, instead of based totally upon extra subjective elements.[70]

Discriminatory intent and disparate impact

Main article: Disparate impact

Because inequalities can also be led to either intentionally or by chance, the Supreme Court has decided that the Equal Protection Clause itself does no longer forbid governmental policies that by accident lead to racial disparities, despite the fact that Congress may have some energy beneath different clauses of the Constitution to deal with unintentional disparate affects. This matter was addressed in the seminal case of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. (1977). In that case, the plaintiff, a housing developer, sued a city in the suburbs of Chicago that had refused to re-zone a plot of land on which the plaintiff intended to construct low-income, racially integrated housing. On the face, there was no transparent evidence of racially discriminatory intent on the part of Arlington Heights's making plans commission. The end result was racially disparate, on the other hand, since the refusal supposedly prevented mostly African-Americans and Hispanics from transferring in. Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the Court, mentioned, "Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Disparate have an effect on merely has an evidentiary price; absent a "stark" development, "impact is not determinative."[71]

The lead to Arlington Heights was identical to that during Washington v. Davis (1976), and has been defended on the foundation that the Equal Protection Clause was not designed to guarantee equal outcomes, yet quite equal opportunities; if a legislature desires to right kind unintentional yet racially disparate results, it may be ready to accomplish that thru additional law.[72] It is conceivable for a discriminating state to disguise its true goal, and one conceivable solution is for disparate impact to be thought to be as stronger evidence of discriminatory intent.[73] This debate, although, is these days educational, since the Supreme Court has not modified its basic way as outlined in Arlington Heights.

For an example of ways this rule limits the Court's powers below the Equal Protection Clause, see McClesky v. Kemp (1987). In that case a black guy was convicted of murdering a white police officer and sentenced to loss of life in the state of Georgia. A study discovered that killers of whites had been more likely to be sentenced to dying than have been killers of blacks.[74] The Court discovered that the defense had failed to end up that such knowledge demonstrated the considered necessary discriminatory intent by means of the Georgia legislature and government branch.

The "Stop and Frisk" policy in New York lets in officials to prevent anyone who they really feel seems to be suspicious. Data from police stops presentations that even when controlling for variability, people who find themselves black and those of Hispanic descent had been stopped extra continuously than white people, with those statistics courting back to the overdue 1990s. A time period that has been created to describe the disproportionate selection of police stops of black other folks is "Driving While Black." This time period is used to describe the stopping of blameless black individuals who are not committing any crime.

In addition to concerns that a discriminating statute can disguise its true purpose, there have also been issues that facially neutral evaluative and statistical gadgets that are permitted by means of decision-makers can also be topic to racial bias and unfair appraisals of ability.'[75] As the equal protection doctrine closely is determined by the skill of neutral evaluative gear to have interaction in neutral selection procedures, racial biases not directly authorised underneath the doctrine will have grave ramifications and result in 'uneven stipulations.' '[76][77] These problems will also be especially outstanding in areas of public advantages, employment, and school admissions, and so forth.'[78]

Voting rights

Justice John Marshall Harlan II sought to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in the context of Section 2 of the similar amendment

The Supreme Court ruled in Nixon v. Herndon (1927) that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited denial of the vote in accordance with race. The first fashionable application of the Equal Protection Clause to balloting regulation came in Baker v. Carr (1962), the place the Court dominated that the districts that despatched representatives to the Tennessee state legislature were so malapportioned (with some legislators representing ten instances the choice of residents as others) that they violated the Equal Protection Clause.

It might seem counterintuitive that the Equal Protection Clause will have to supply for equal vote casting rights; in any case, it would seem to make the Fifteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth Amendment redundant. Indeed, it was in this argument, in addition to on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, that Justice John M. Harlan (the grandson of the earlier Justice Harlan) relied in his dissent from Reynolds. Harlan quoted the congressional debates of 1866 to show that the framers did not intend for the Equal Protection Clause to lengthen to balloting rights, and in reference to the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, he said:

If constitutional amendment was the most effective means through which all males and, later, ladies, might be guaranteed the correct to vote at all, even for federal officers, how can it be that the some distance much less glaring appropriate to a particular more or less apportionment of state legislatures ... may also be conferred by way of judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment? [Emphasis in the unique.]

Harlan additionally relied on the proven fact that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment "expressly recognizes the States' power to deny 'or in any way' abridge the right of their inhabitants to vote for 'the members of the [state] Legislature.'"[79] Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment supplies a particular federal response to such actions via a state: relief of a state's representation in Congress. However, the Supreme Court has instead spoke back that balloting is a "fundamental right" on the identical plane as marriage (Loving v. Virginia); for any discrimination in basic rights to be constitutional, the Court requires the regulation to cross strict scrutiny. Under this principle, equal protection jurisprudence has been implemented to balloting rights.

A contemporary use of equal protection doctrine came in Bush v. Gore (2000). At issue was the arguable recount in Florida in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. There, the Supreme Court held that the other standards of counting ballots throughout Florida violated the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court used four of its rulings from Nineteen Sixties voting rights instances (certainly one of which was Reynolds v. Sims) to toughen its ruling in Bush v. Gore. It was now not this holding that proved particularly arguable amongst commentators, and indeed, the proposition won seven out of 9 votes; Justices Souter and Breyer joined the majority of five—but only for the finding that there was an Equal Protection violation. Much extra debatable was the remedy that the Court selected, particularly, the cessation of a statewide recount.[80]

Sex, incapacity, and sexual orientation

Originally, the Fourteenth Amendment didn't forbid sex discrimination to the identical extent as different sorts of discrimination. On the one hand, Section Two of the amendment specifically discouraged states from interfering with the vote casting rights of "males", which made the modification anathema to many women when it was proposed in 1866.[81] On the different hand, as feminists like Victoria Woodhull pointed out, the phrase "person" in the Equal Protection Clause was it sounds as if chosen deliberately, as an alternative of a masculine term that will have simply been used as a substitute.[82]

Each state can guarantee extra equality than does the Equal Protection Clause. For instance, the state of Wyoming granted ladies the appropriate to vote even ahead of the Nineteenth Amendment required it.

In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed, extending the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect ladies from sex discrimination, in situations where there is no rational foundation for the discrimination.[83] That stage of scrutiny was boosted to an intermediate level in Craig v. Boren (1976).[84]

The Supreme Court has been disinclined to prolong complete "suspect classification" standing (thus making a law that categorizes on that foundation topic to greater judicial scrutiny) for teams instead of racial minorities and non secular teams. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985), the Court refused to make the developmentally disabled a suspect class. Many commentators have noted, on the other hand—and Justice Thurgood Marshall so notes in his partial concurrence—that the Court did appear to read about the City of Cleburne's denial of a permit to a group home for intellectually disabled people with a considerably higher stage of scrutiny than is normally related to the rational-basis take a look at.[85]

The Court's decision in Romer v. Evans (1996) struck down a Colorado constitutional modification aimed at denying homosexuals "minority status, quota preferences, protected status or [a] claim of discrimination." The Court rejected as "implausible" the dissent's argument that the modification would no longer deprive homosexuals of normal protections equipped to everybody else but quite would simply save you "special treatment of homosexuals."[86] Much as in City of Cleburne, the Romer decision gave the impression to make use of a markedly upper degree of scrutiny than the nominally carried out rational-basis test.[87]

In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting gay sodomy on substantive due process grounds. In Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment, on the other hand, she argued that through prohibiting most effective gay sodomy, and no longer heterosexual sodomy as neatly, Texas's statute didn't meet rational-basis assessment below the Equal Protection Clause; her opinion prominently cited City of Cleburne, and in addition relied partially on Romer. Notably, O'Connor's opinion did not claim to apply a higher stage of scrutiny than mere rational basis, and the Court has now not extended suspect-class standing to sexual orientation.

While the courts have implemented rational-basis scrutiny to classifications in keeping with sexual orientation, it's been argued that discrimination in line with intercourse will have to be interpreted to include discrimination in accordance with sexual orientation, through which case intermediate scrutiny could follow to homosexual rights instances.[88] Other scholars disagree, arguing that "homophobia" is distinct from sexism, in a sociological sense, and so treating it as such can be an unacceptable judicial shortcut.[89]

In 2013, the Court struck down part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, in United States v. Windsor. No state statute was in question, and subsequently the Equal Protection Clause did not follow. The Court did make use of equivalent principles, however, in combination with federalism ideas. The Court did not purport to use any level of scrutiny extra challenging than rational basis evaluation, in accordance to legislation professor Erwin Chemerinsky.[90] The four dissenting justices argued that the authors of the statute were rational.[91]

In 2015, the Supreme Court held in a 5–4 decision that the basic right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by means of each the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and required all states to factor marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages validly carried out in different jurisdictions.

Affirmative action

See additionally: Affirmative action in the United States

Affirmative motion is the attention of race, gender, or different factors, to get advantages an underrepresented team or to deal with past injustices done to that group. Individuals who belong to the workforce are most popular over those that do not belong to the crew, for example in tutorial admissions, hiring, promotions, awarding of contracts, and the like.[92] Such action could also be used as a "tie-breaker" if all different factors are inconclusive, or is also achieved thru quotas, which allot a definite selection of advantages to every workforce.

During Reconstruction, Congress enacted race-conscious methods essentially to lend a hand newly freed slaves who had in my opinion been denied many advantages earlier in their lives. Such regulation was enacted via lots of the same people who framed the Equal Protection Clause, regardless that that clause didn't follow to such federal law, and as a substitute simplest applied to state regulation.[93] Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause does no longer apply to private universities and other personal businesses, which can be unfastened to practice affirmative motion unless prohibited through federal statute or state legislation.

Several important affirmative motion circumstances to achieve the Supreme Court have involved executive contractors—for instance, Adarand Constructors v. Peña (1995) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989). But the most renowned instances have handled affirmative action as practiced via public universities: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), and two companion cases decided by way of the Supreme Court in 2003, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.

In Bakke, the Court held that racial quotas are unconstitutional, but that tutorial institutions could legally use race as one of the factors to believe of their admissions process. In Grutter and Gratz, the Court upheld both Bakke as a precedent and the admissions coverage of the University of Michigan Law School. In dicta, on the other hand, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated she anticipated that during 25 years, racial preferences would now not be necessary. In Gratz, the Court invalidated Michigan's undergraduate admissions coverage, on the grounds that in contrast to the law school's coverage, which treated race as one of many elements in an admissions procedure that appeared to the person applicant, the undergraduate policy used some extent device that was excessively mechanistic.

In these affirmative action circumstances, the Supreme Court has hired, or has said it employed, strict scrutiny, since the affirmative motion insurance policies challenged through the plaintiffs categorized by means of race. The policy in Grutter, and a Harvard College admissions policy praised via Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, handed muster as a result of the Court deemed that they have been narrowly adapted to reach a compelling passion in range. On one side, critics have argued—including Justice Clarence Thomas in his dissent to Grutter—that the scrutiny the Court has carried out in some circumstances is much much less looking than true strict scrutiny, and that the Court has acted not as a principled criminal institution yet as a biased political one.[94] On the other aspect, it is argued that the function of the Equal Protection Clause is to save you the socio-political subordination of some groups by means of others, now not to prevent classification; since that is so, non-invidious classifications, such as those used by affirmative motion techniques, should not be subjected to heightened scrutiny.[95]

See additionally

Economic egalitarianism Egalitarianism Equal consideration of pursuits Equal opportunity Equal Rights Amendment Equality earlier than the legislation Equality feminism Equality of autonomy Equality of result Equality of sacrifice Racial equality Social equality

References

^ .mw-parser-output cite.citationfont-style:inherit.mw-parser-output .citation qquotes:"\"""\"""'""'".mw-parser-output .id-lock-free a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-free abackground:linear-gradient(clear,clear),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Lock-green.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat.mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-registration abackground:linear-gradient(transparent,clear),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg")correct 0.1em center/9px no-repeat.mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription a,.mw-parser-output .quotation .cs1-lock-subscription abackground:linear-gradient(clear,transparent),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registrationcoloration:#555.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription span,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration spanborder-bottom:1px dotted;cursor:help.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon abackground:linear-gradient(clear,clear),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg")appropriate 0.1em center/12px no-repeat.mw-parser-output code.cs1-codecoloration:inherit;background:inherit;border:none;padding:inherit.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-errorshow:none;font-size:100%.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-errorfont-size:100%.mw-parser-output .cs1-maintshow:none;colour:#33aa33;margin-left:0.3em.mw-parser-output .cs1-formatfont-size:95%.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-leftpadding-left:0.2em.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-rightpadding-right:0.2em.mw-parser-output .citation .mw-selflinkfont-weight:inheritFailinger, Marie (2009). "Equal protection of the laws". In Schultz, David Andrew (ed.). The Encyclopedia of American Law. Infobase. pp. 152–53. ISBN 9781438109916. Archived from the unique on July 24, 2020. The equal protection clause promises the appropriate of "similarly situated" other folks to be treated the identical approach via the regulation. ^ "Fair Treatment by the Government: Equal Protection". GeorgiaLegalAssist.org. Carl Vinson Institute of Government at University of Georgia. July 30, 2004. Archived from the unique on March 20, 2020. Retrieved July 24, 2020. The elementary intent of equal protection is to ensure that people are treated as similarly as conceivable below our prison device. For instance, it is to see that everyone who will get a dashing price tag will face the samEpocedures [sic!]. An additional intent is to ensure that all Americans are supplied with equal opportunities in training, employment, and other areas. [...] The U.S. Constitution makes a identical provision in the Fourteenth Amendment. It says that no state shall make or enforce any legislation that may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." These provisions require the executive to deal with persons similarly and impartially. ^ "Equal Protection". Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School. Archived from the authentic on June 22, 2020. Retrieved July 24, 2020. Equal Protection refers to the concept that a governmental body may not deny other people equal protection of its governing regulations. The governing body state must treat a person in the same manner as others in similar conditions and circumstances. ^ Antieau, Chester James (1952). "Equal Protection outside the Clause". California Law Review. 40 (3): 362–377. doi:10.2307/3477928. JSTOR 3477928. ^ a b "Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)". Justia Law. Retrieved 2018-11-10. ^ "Dred Scott, 150 Years Ago". The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education (55): 19. 2007. JSTOR 25073625. ^ Swisher, Carl Brent (1957). "Dred Scott One Hundred Years After". The Journal of Politics. 19 (2): 167–183. doi:10.2307/2127194. JSTOR 2127194. S2CID 154345582. ^ For details on the rationale for, and ratification of, the Fourteenth Amendment, see usually Foner, Eric (1988). Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863—1877. New York: Harper & Row. ISBN 978-0-06-091453-0., in addition to Brest, Paul; et al. (2000). Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking. Gaithersburg: Aspen Law & Business. pp. 241–242. ISBN 978-0-7355-1250-4. ^ See Brest et al. (2000), pp. 242–46. ^ Rosen, Jeffrey. The Supreme Court: The Personalities and Rivalries That Defined America, p. 79 (MacMillan 2007). ^ Newman, Roger. The Constitution and its Amendments, Vol. 4, p. 8 (Macmillan 1999). ^ Hardy, David. "Original Popular Understanding of the 14th Amendment As Reflected in the Print Media of 1866-68", Whittier Law Review, Vol. 30, p. 695 (2008-2009). ^ See Foner (1988), passim. See also Ackerman, Bruce A. (2000). We the People, Volume 2: Transformations. Cambridge: Belknap Press. pp. 99–252. ISBN 978-0-674-00397-2. ^ a b Zuckert, Michael P. (1992). "Completing the Constitution: The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights". Publius. 22 (2): 69–91. doi:10.2307/3330348. JSTOR 3330348. ^ a b "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)". Justia Law. Retrieved 2018-11-30. ^ a b c Perry, Michael J. (1979). "Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal". Columbia Law Review. 79 (6): 1023–1084. doi:10.2307/1121988. JSTOR 1121988. ^ a b Boyd, William M. (1955). "The Second Emancipation". Phylon. 16 (1): 77–86. doi:10.2307/272626. JSTOR 272626. ^ Sumner, Charles, and Daniel Murray Pamphlet Collection. . Washington: S. & R. O. Polkinhorn, Printers, 1874. Pdf. https://www.loc.gov/item/12005313/. ^ Frank, John P.; Munro, Robert F. (1950). "The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws"". Columbia Law Review. 50 (2): 131–169. doi:10.2307/1118709. JSTOR 1118709. ^ "Constitution of the United States - We the People". launchknowledge.com. ^ "Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)". Justia Law. Retrieved 2018-11-10. ^ a b Kelly, Alfred. "Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair", The Supreme Court Review at p. 148 (1965) reprinted in The Supreme Court in and of the Stream of Power (Kermit Hall ed., Psychology Press 2000). ^ Bickel, Alexander. "The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision", Harvard Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 35-37 (1955). Bingham was speaking on February 27, 1866. See transcript. ^ Curtis, Michael. "Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment", Boston College Law Review, Vol. 38 (1997). ^ Glidden, William. Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment: Enforcing Liberty and Equality in the States, p. 79 (Lexington Books 2013). ^ Mount, Steve (January 2007). "Ratification of Constitutional Amendments". Retrieved February 24, 2007. ^ Flack, Horace. The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, p. 232 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1908). For Bingham's complete speech, see Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Sess., p. 83 (March 31, 1871). ^ requires quotation ^ Wallenstein, Peter. Tell the Court I Love My Wife: Race, Marriage, and Law--An American History, p. 253 (Palgrave Macmillan, Jan 17, 2004). The 4 of the unique 13 states are New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Id. ^ Pascoe, Peggy. What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America, p. 58 (Oxford U. Press 2009). ^ Calabresi, Steven and Matthews, Andrea. "Originalism and Loving v. Virginia", Brigham Young University Law Review (2012). ^ Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877, pp. 321–322 (HarperCollins 2002). ^ Bickel, Alexander. "The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision", Harvard Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 35–37 (1955). ^ Finkelman, Paul. "Rehearsal for Reconstruction: Antebellum Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment", in The Facts of Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of John Hope Franklin, p. 19 (Eric Anderson and Alfred A. Moss, eds., LSU Press, 1991). ^ Woloch, Nancy. Women and the American Experience, p. 185 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). ^ Wayne, Stephen. Is This Any Way to Run a Democratic Election?, p. 27 (CQ PRESS 2013). ^ McInerney, Daniel. A Traveller's History of the USA, p. 212 (Interlink Books, 2001). ^ Kerber, Linda. No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship, p. 133 (Macmillan, 1999). ^ Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). ^ "Annotation 18 - Fourteenth Amendment: Section 1 – Rights Guaranteed: Equal Protection of the Laws: Scope and application state action". In findingLaw for Legal Professionals - Law & Legal Information by way of To findLaw, a Thomson Reuters industry. Retrieved 23 November 2013. ^ For a summary of the social, political and historic background to Plessy, see Woodward, C. Vann (2001). The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 6 and pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-0-19-514690-5. ^ For a skeptical analysis of Harlan, see Chin, Gabriel J. (1996). "The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases". Iowa Law Review. 82: 151. ISSN 0021-0552. SSRN 1121505. ^ See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). In the abstract of the case Bancroft wrote that the Court declared that it didn't need to listen argument on whether the Equal Protection Clause safe firms, because "we are all of the opinion that it does." Id. at 396. Chief Justice Morrison Waite introduced from the bench that the Court would not listen argument on the query whether the equal protection clause implemented to corporations: "We are all of the opinion that it does." The background and traits from this utterance are handled in H. Graham, Everyman's Constitution--Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Conspiracy Theory, and American Constitutionalism (1968), chs. 9, 10, and pp. 566-84. Justice Hugo Black, in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938), and Justice William O. Douglas, in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949), have disagreed that companies are persons for equal protection purposes. ^ See Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514 (1830), through which Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men." Nevertheless, the concept of company personhood stays arguable. See Mayer, Carl J. (1990). "Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights". Hastings Law Journal. 41: 577. ISSN 0017-8322. ^ See Currie, David P. (1987). "The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940". University of Chicago Law Review (Submitted manuscript). 54 (2): 504–555. doi:10.2307/1599798. JSTOR 1599798. ^ Feldman, Noah. Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR's Great Supreme Court Justices, p. 145 (Hachette Digital 2010). ^ See typically Morris, Aldon D. (1986). Origin of the Civil Rights Movements: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-922130-3. ^ Karlan, Pamela S. (2009). "What Can Brown® do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause". Duke Law Journal. 58 (6): 1049–1069. JSTOR 20684748. ^ For an exhaustive history of the Brown case from start to end, see Kluger, Richard (1977). Simple Justice. New York: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-394-72255-9. ^ Shimsky, MaryJane. "Hesitating Between Two Worlds": The Civil Rights Odyssey of Robert H. Jackson, p. 468 (ProQuest, 2007). ^ I Dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases, pp. 133–151 (Mark Tushnet, ed. Beacon Press, 2008). ^ For a complete history of school desegregation from Brown thru Milliken (one on which this article is based for its assertions), see Brest et al. (2000), pp. 768–794. ^ For the historical past of the American political branches' engagement with the Supreme Court's commitment to desegregation (and vice versa), see Powe, Lucas A., Jr. (2001). The Warren Court and American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00683-6., and Kotz, Nick (2004). Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Laws That Changed America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 978-0-618-08825-6. For extra on the debate summarized in the text, see, e.g., Rosenberg, Gerald N. (1993). The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-72703-5., and Klarman, Michael J. (1994). "Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement". Virginia Law Review. 80 (1): 7–150. doi:10.2307/1073592. JSTOR 1073592. ^ Reynolds, Troy. "Education Finance Reform Litigation and Separation of Powers: Kentucky Makes Its Contribution," Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 80 (1991): 309, 310. ^ Minow, Martha. "Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education and American Pluralism", Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120, p. 814, 819-820 (2011)(Pierce "entrenched the pattern of a two-tiered system of schooling, which sanctions private opt-outs from publicly run schools"). ^ For information and research, see Orfield (July 2001). "Schools More Separate" (PDF). Harvard University Civil Rights Project. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-06-28. Retrieved 2008-07-16. ^ Jacobs, Nicholas (8 August 2011). "Racial, Economic, and Linguistic Segregation: Analyzing Market Supports in the District of Columbia's Public Charter Schools". Education and Urban Society. 45 (1): 120–141. doi:10.1177/0013124511407317. S2CID 144814662. Retrieved 28 October 2013. ^ "FindLaw | Cases and Codes". Caselaw.lp.findlaw.com. 1954-05-17. Retrieved 2012-08-13. ^ Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 598 (2003), at web page 2482 ^ Balkin, J. M.; Bruce A. Ackerman (2001). "Part II". What Brown v. Board of Education will have to have said : the country's top legal experts rewrite America's landmark civil rights resolution. et al. New York University Press. p. 168. ^ 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a concept of judicial review in keeping with Stone's footnote, see Ely, John Hart (1981). Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-19637-6. ^ Goldstein, Leslie. "Between the Tiers: The New(est) Equal Protection and Bush v. Gore Archived 2016-03-04 at the Wayback Machine", University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 4, p. 372 (2002) . ^ Farber, Daniel and Frickey, Philip. "Is Carolene Products Dead--Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation", California Law Review, Vol. 79, p. 685 (1991). Farber and Frickey indicate that "only Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Brandeis, and Justice Roberts joined Justice Stone's footnote", and in any event "It is simply a myth ... that the process theory of footnote four in Carolene Products is, or ever has been, the primary justification for invalidating laws embodying prejudice against racial minorities." ^ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Sometimes the "suspect" classification strand of the modern doctrine is attributed to Korematsu v. United States (1944), but Korematsu did not involve the Fourteenth Amendment, and moreover it came later than the Skinner opinion (which obviously mentioned that each deprivation of fundamental rights as well as oppression of a particular race or nationality were invidious). ^ See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) ^ See United States v. Virginia (1996). ^ a b Fleming, James. "'There is Only One Equal Protection Clause': An Appreciation of Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence", Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, p. 2301, 2306 (2006). ^ See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996): "the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons." ^ Curry, James et al. Constitutional Government: The American Experience, p. 282 (Kendall Hunt 2003) (attributing the word to Gerald Gunther). ^ Domino, John. Civil Rights & Liberties in the twenty first Century, pp. 337-338 (Pearson 2009). ^ Kroll, Joshua (2017). "Accountable Algorithms (Ricci v. DeStefano: The Tensions Between Equal Protection, Disparate Treatment, and Disparate Impact)". University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 165: 692. ^ Herzog, Don (March 22, 2005). "Constitutional Rights: Two". Left2Right. Note that the Court has put vital limits on the congressional energy of enforcement. See City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett (2001), and United States v. Morrison (2000). The Court has additionally interpreted federal statutory regulation as limiting the energy of states to correct disparate effects. See Ricci v. DeStefano (2009). ^ See Krieger, Linda Hamilton (1995). "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Protection Opportunity". Stanford Law Review. 47 (6): 1161–1248. doi:10.2307/1229191. hdl:10125/66110. JSTOR 1229191., and Lawrence, Charles R., III (1987). "Reckoning with Unconscious Racism". Stanford Law Review. 39 (2): 317–388. doi:10.2307/1228797. hdl:10125/65975. JSTOR 1228797. ^ Baldus, David C.; Pulaski, Charles; Woodworth, George (1983). "Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience". Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (Submitted manuscript). 74 (3): 661–753. doi:10.2307/1143133. JSTOR 1143133. ^ Feingold, Jonathon (2019). "Equal Protection Design Defects". Temple Law Review. 91. ^ Feingold, Jonathon (2019). "Equal Protection Design Defects". Temple Law Review. 91. ^ Barocas, Solon (2016). "Big Data's Disparate Impact". California Law Review. 104. ^ Feingold, Jonathon (2019). "Equal Protection Design Defects". Temple Law Review. 91. ^ Van Alstyne, William. "The Fourteenth Amendment, the Right to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress", Supreme Court Review, p. 33 (1965). ^ For criticisms as well as several defenses of the Court's decision, see Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy, edited through Ackerman, Bruce A. (2002). Bush v. Gore : the query of legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-09379-7. Another much-cited selection of essays is Sunstein, Cass; Epstein, Richard (2001). The Vote: Bush, Gore, and the Supreme Court. Chicago: Chicago University Press. ISBN 978-0-226-21307-1. ^ Cullen-Dupont, Kathryn. Encyclopedia of Women's History in America, pp. 91-92 (Infobase Publishing, Jan 1, 2009). ^ Hymowitz, Carol and Weissman, Michaele. A History of Women in America, p. 128 (Random House Digital, 2011). ^ "Reed v. Reed - Significance, Notable Trials and Court Cases - 1963 to 1972" ^ Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). ^ See Pettinga, Gayle Lynn (1987). "Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name". Indiana Law Journal. 62: 779. ISSN 0019-6665.; Wadhwani, Neelum J. (2006). "Rational Reviews, Irrational Results". Texas Law Review. 84: 801, 809–811. ISSN 0040-4411. ^ Kuligowski, Monte. "Romer v. Evans: Judicial Judgment or Emotive Utterance?," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, Vol. 12 (1996). ^ Joslin, Courtney (1997). "Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation". Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. 32: 225, 240. ISSN 0017-8039. The Romer Court implemented a more 'active,' Cleburne-like rational foundation usual ...; Farrell, Robert C. (1999). "Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans". Indiana Law Review. 32: 357. ISSN 0019-6665. ^ See Koppelman, Andrew (1994). "Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination". New York University Law Review. 69: 197. ISSN 0028-7881.; see additionally Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F.Supp. 381, 388, fn. 6 (1980), vacated 627 F.2d 1088 [case made up our minds on First Amendment free-speech grounds, but "This case can also be profitably analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. In preventing Aaron Fricke from attending the senior reception, the school has afforded disparate treatment to a certain class of students those wishing to attend the reception with companions of the same sex."] ^ Gerstmann, Evan. Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, p. 55 (Cambridge University Press, 2004). ^ Chemerinsky, Erwin. "Justice Kennedy's World Archived 2013-07-09 at the Wayback Machine", The National Law Journal (July 1, 2013): "There is another similarity between his opinion in Windsor and his earlier ones in Romer and Lawrence: the Supreme Court invalidated the law without using heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation discrimination ... A law based on animus fails to meet even rational-basis review so there was no need to adopt a higher level of scrutiny." ^ United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 2013 BL 169620, 118 FEP Cases 1417 (U.S. June 26, 2013). ^ "Affirmative Action". Stanford University. Retrieved April 6, 2012. ^ See Schnapper, Eric (1985). "Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment" (PDF). Virginia Law Review. 71 (5): 753–798. doi:10.2307/1073012. JSTOR 1073012. ^ See Schuck, Peter H. (September 5, 2003). "Reflections on Grutter". Jurist. Archived from the unique on 2005-09-09. ^ See Siegel, Reva B. (2004). "Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown". Harvard Law Review (Submitted manuscript). 117 (5): 1470–1547. doi:10.2307/4093259. JSTOR 4093259.; Carter, Stephen L. (1988). "When Victims Happen to Be Black". Yale Law Journal. 97 (3): 420–447. doi:10.2307/796412. JSTOR 796412.

External links

Original Meaning of Equal Protection of the Laws, Federalist Blog Equal Protection: An Overview, Cornell Law School Equal Protection, Heritage Guide to the Constitution Equal Protection (U.S. legislation), Encyclopædia BritannicaNaderi, Siavash. "The Not So Definite Article", Brown Political Review (November 16, 2012).vteConstitution of the United StatesArticles Preamble I II III IV V VI VIIAmendmentsRatifiedBill of Rights 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101795–1804 11 12Reconstruction 13 14 1520th century 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27Pending Congressional Apportionment Titles of Nobility Corwin Amendment Child LaborPast time limit Equal Rights District of Columbia Voting RightsProposedamendments Balanced budget amendment Blaine Amendment Bricker Amendment Campaign finance reform modification Christian modification Crittenden Compromise Electoral College abolition amendment Equal Opportunity to Govern Amendment Federal Marriage Amendment Flag Desecration Amendment Human Life Amendment Ludlow Amendment Parental Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution Proposed "Liberty" Amendment to the United States Constitution School Prayer Amendment Single topic modification Victims' Rights Amendment Convention to propose amendments State ratifying conventionsFormation History Articles of Confederation Mount Vernon Conference Annapolis Convention Philadelphia Convention Virginia Plan New Jersey Plan Connecticut Compromise Three-fifths Compromise Committee of Detail Signing Independence Hall Syng inkstand The Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Papers Massachusetts Compromise Virginia Ratifying Convention New York Circular Letter Hillsborough Convention Fayetteville Convention Rhode Island ratification Drafting and ratification timelineClauses Appointments Appropriations Assistance of Counsel Case or Controversy Citizenship Commerce Compact Compulsory Process Confrontation Congressional enforcement Contract Copyright and Patent Double Jeopardy Due Process Elections Equal Protection Establishment Exceptions Excessive Bail Ex post facto Extradition Free Exercise Free Speech Fugitive Slave Full Faith and Credit General Welfare Guarantee Impeachment Import-Export Ineligibility Militia Natural-born citizen Necessary and Proper New States No Religious Test Oath or Affirmation Origination Pardon Petition Postal Presentment Presidential succession Privileges and Immunities Privileges or Immunities Recess appointment Recommendation Self-Incrimination Speech or Debate Speedy Trial State of the Union Supremacy Suspension Take Care Takings Taxing and Spending Territorial Title of Nobility (Foreign Emoluments) Treaty Trial by Jury Vesting Vicinage War PowersInterpretation Balance of powers Concurrent powers Constitutional legislation Criminal process Criminal sentencing Dormant Commerce Clause Enumerated powers Equal footing Executive privilege Implied powers Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Judicial assessment Nondelegation doctrine Plenary power Preemption Reserved powers Saxbe fix Separation of church and state Separation of powers Symmetric federalism Taxation power Unitary government theoryDisplayand legacy National Archives Charters of Freedom Rotunda Independence Mall Constitution Day Constitution Gardens National Constitution Center Scene at the Signing of the Constitution (painting) A More Perfect Union (film) USS Constitution Worldwide affectUnited States Portal • Law Portal • Wikipedia ebook vteUnited States equal protection and prison procedure case lawSelective prosecution McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) United States v. Armstrong (1996)Discrimination in jury selectionHistory Racial discrimination in jury variety Women in United States juriesRacial exclusion in venire Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) Virginia v. Rives (1880) Neal v. Delaware (1881) Gibson v. Mississippi (1896) Smith v. Mississippi (1896) Carter v. Texas (1900) Tarrance v. Florida (1903) Brownfield v. South Carolina (1903) Rogers v. Alabama (1904) Franklin v. South Carolina (1910) Norris v. Alabama (1935) Patterson v. Alabama (1935) Hale v. Kentucky (1938) Smith v. Texas (1940) Hill v. Texas (1942) Patton v. Mississippi (1947) Cassell v. Texas (1950) Avery v. Georgia (1953) Hernandez v. Texas (1954) Eubanks v. Louisiana (1958) Coleman v. Alabama (1967) Vasquez v. Hillery (1986)Fair cross-section in venire Glasser v. United States (1942)* Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946)** Ballard v. United States (1946) Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) Duren v. Missouri (1979) Holland v. Illinois (1990) Berghuis v. Smith (2010)Peremptory demanding situations Batson v. Kentucky (1986) Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) Teague v. Lane (1989) Ford v. Georgia (1991) Powers v. Ohio (1991) Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company (1991)** Hernandez v. New York (1991) Trevino v. Texas (1992) Georgia v. McCollum (1992) J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) Purkett v. Elem (1995) Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) Johnson v. California (2005) Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) Rice v. Collins (2006) Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) Rivera v. Illinois (2009) Thaler v. Haynes (2010) Felkner v. Jackson (2011) Foster v. Chatman (2015) Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) *Glasser interpreted the Impartial Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment. **Thiel and Edmonson were civil circumstances. vteVoting rights in the United StatesConstitutionalprovisions Article I Voter Qualifications Clause Elections Clause 1st Amendment 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause 15th Amendment 17th Amendment 19th Amendment 23rd Amendment twenty fourth Amendment twenty sixth AmendmentFederal regulations Voting Rights Act of 1965 Amendments List of coated jurisdictions Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act National Voter Registration Act of 1993 Help America Vote Act of 2002State lawsVoter get entry to Absentee ballot Early voting Initiatives and referendums Postal balloting Provisional poll Recall election Voter registration in the U.S.Vote denial Electoral fraud Grandfather clause Literacy check Poll tax Voter caging Voter ID regulationsVote dilution First-past-the-post vote casting Gerrymandering Multiple non-transferable vote One guy, one vote Ranked-choice balloting in the U.S.By workforce Men Women African Americans Native Americans Youth Felons Foreigners Transgender people District of Columbia residents Puerto Rico residents Guam citizensHistory Timeline Disenfranchisement after the Reconstruction generation Timeline of women's suffrage Suffrage Hikes Woman Suffrage Procession Silent Sentinels U.S. suffragists Publications "Give Us the Ballot" Freedom Summer Selma to Montgomery marches Women's poll tax repeal motion History of direct democracyRelated Ballot get admission to Campaign finance Citizenship Native Americans Disfranchisement Election Election legislation Elections in the U.S. Electoral College Electoral reform Electoral machine Instant-runoff vote casting National Voting Rights Museum Redistricting Secret poll Suffrage Voter registration Voting vteUnited States 14th Amendment case legislationCitizenship Clause Slaughter-House Cases (1873) Elk v. Wilkins (1884) United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) Perez v. Brownell (1958) Afroyim v. Rusk (1967) Rogers v. Bellei (1971) Saenz v. Roe (1999)Due Process ClauseEconomic substantivedue procedure Mugler v. Kansas (1887) Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) Lochner v. New York (1905) Coppage v. Kansas (1915) Adams v. Tanner (1917) Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923)Right to privateness Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) Doe v. Bolton (1973) Roe v. Wade (1973) Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) Lawrence v. Texas (2003) Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)Right to abortion United States v. Vuitch (1971) Doe v. Bolton (1973) Roe v. Wade (1973) H. L. v. Matheson (1981) City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990) Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) Mazurek v. Armstrong (1997) Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England (2006) Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. (2019) June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo (2020)Civil rights liabilityunder Section 1983 Monroe v. Pape (1961) McNeese v. Board of Education (1963) Pierson v. Ray (1967) Jenkins v. McKeithen (1969) Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) Wood v. Strickland (1975) O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) Paul v. Davis (1976) Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York (1978) Procunier v. Navarette (1978) Owen v. City of Independence (1980) Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) Felder v. Casey (1988) Will v. Michigan Department of State Police (1989) Gonzaga University v. Doe (2002) Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community (2003) City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams (2005) Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee (2009) Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) Los Angeles County v. Humphries (2010) Connick v. Thompson (2011)Other Holden v. Hardy (1898) Muller v. Oregon (1908) Buck v. Bell (1927) Powell v. Alabama (1932) West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) NAACP v. Alabama (1958) Loving v. Virginia (1967) Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) In re Winship (1971) Kolender v. Lawson (1983) Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) Troxel v. Granville (2000) Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)Equal Protection Clause United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Pace v. Alabama (1883) Civil Rights Cases (1883) Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Buchanan v. Warley (1917) Lum v. Rice (1927) Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) Perez v. Sharp (1948) Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1948) Sweatt v. Painter (1950) McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950) Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) Hernandez v. Texas (1954) Anderson v. Martin (1964) Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (1964) Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) Loving v. Virginia (1967) Williams v. Rhodes (1968) Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971) Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson (1971) Reed v. Reed (1971) Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) Milliken v. Bradley (1974) Craig v. Boren (1976) Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) Plyler v. Doe (1982) Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) Hunter v. Underwood (1985) United States v. Virginia (1996) Romer v. Evans (1996) Bush v. Gore (2000) Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007) Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) National Coalition for Men v. Selective Service System (S.D. Tex., 2019)Others Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Equal_Protection_Clause&oldid=1015320001"

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